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ABSTRACT 
THE RECENT MORATORIUM ON EARMARKS HAS GIVEN RISE TO A NEW AND LARGELY HIDDEN 
PRACTICE FOR SECURING DISTRIBUTIVE BENEFITS: LETTER-MARKING.  LETTER-MARKING 
OCCURS WHEN MEMBERS OF CONGRESS ASK (IN WRITING) THE HEAD OF AN AGENCY TO 
RETAIN OR ALLOCATE DISTRIBUTIVE BENEFITS IN THEIR DISTRICTS.  WHILE LETTER-MARKING 
IS COMMON IN WASHINGTON, THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE HAS IGNORED THIS PRACTICE. WE 
USE A UNIQUE DATASET OF 101 CONGRESSIONAL LETTERS RELATING TO FAA FUNDING AND 
EMPIRICALLY ASSESS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE LETTER-WRITER’S CHARACTERISTICS AND 
THE LETTER’S CONTENT IMPACT THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES.  IN DOING 
SO, WE OFFER A NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF LETTER-MARKING. 
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Speaking to reporters following passage of a $1.1 trillion omnibus appropriations bill to fund the 
government for FY 2014, Senate Appropriations chairwoman Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) boasted, “There 
were no earmarks in this bill!” Down the hall, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), chairwoman of the Senate 
Committee on the Budget, boasted about the bill’s strong investment in natural resources and how she 
“scored dozens of wins” for her district (Altman 2014).  The conflicting statements of Senators Mikluski 
and Murray illustrate an important but largely unexplored shift in the way members of Congress attempt to 
secure distributive benefits for their districts.  Following the 2010 midterm elections, House Republicans 
unanimously adopted a measure to ban all earmarks for the 112th Congress (Montopoli 2010).  The Senate 
followed suit in 2011 by passing a two-year moratorium on earmarks (Inouye 2011).  Both chambers passed 
extensions to these moratoriums for the 113th Congress, which led to the elimination of the traditional 
earmark process where members of Congress request targeted funds for specific projects (Altman 2014).  
The moratorium on earmarks fostered a popular new strategy by members of Congress to secure distributive 
benefits: Letter-marking.   Letter-marking occurs when members of Congress explicitly ask (in writing) the 
head of an administrative agency to retain or allocate distributive benefits in their districts.  In recent years, 
letter-marking has become a common practice in Washington, D.C., with members of Congress requesting 
projects for their districts across a wide range of policy areas (Nixon 2010; Hernandez 2011; Stein 2011; 
Nixon 2012). 
 Much of the literature on distributive politics is centered on the assumption that members of 
Congress use tools such as earmarks to secure distributive benefits in their districts, and then engage in 
credit claiming to highlight their success to constituents to get reelected (Mayhew 1974; Rundquist and 
Ferejohn 1975; Shepsle and Weingast 1984).  As Arnold (1990) argued, members of Congress benefit 
electorally through their ability to produce favorable publicity linked to a positive impact the expenditures 
had on the local economy.  Studies of earmarks focused on the institutional factors that lead to the 
production of earmarks, distribution of earmarks among individual members of Congress, and the influence 
that local demand for projects has on earmark requests (Baron and Ferejohn 1989; Hird 1990; Hird 1991; 
Balla et al. 2002; Evans 2004; Frisch and Kelly 2007; Lazarus 2010).  Many of these “legislative-centric” 
studies, however, operate under the assumption that legislators can use direct tools such as earmarks to 
secure distributive benefits -- an assumption radically altered by the recently enacted earmark moratorium.    
 Other studies of distributive benefits highlighted the role of bureaucratic agencies in allocating 
projects to districts under authority delegated by Congress.  As Lowry and Potoski (2004) remind us, a 
significant portion of the federal budget supports grants and programs that executive agencies implement.  
In his seminal study, Arnold (1979) develops an executive-legislative bargaining theory in which agencies 
strategically reward members of Congress through allocation strategies between bureaucrats and legislators 
(also see Stein and Bickers 1995; 1996). More recent studies explored the factors that lead agencies to 
allocate distributive benefits to specific Congressional districts, including ideological distance between 
agency secretaries and members of Congress; party congruence between the President and members of 
Congress; and the degree of public scrutiny of allocation decisions (Bertelli and Grose 2009; Berry, Burden, 
and Howell 2010; Gordon 2011).  In an attempt to bridge the legislative-executive divide in allocation 
studies, Ting (2012) developed an innovative model that described the conditions under which legislators 
would politicize allocation decisions by using earmarks to secure local projects or professionalize the 
decision by delegating authority for allocating projects through tools such as benefit-cost analysis (Mills 
2013).  Given the earmark moratorium, one could conclude that members of Congress decided to 
professionalize decisions by relying on the technical expertise of agencies to allocate distributive benefits; 
however, it may be the case that the mechanism used (letter-marking), rather than the intent, to politicize 
allocatable decisions has changed.    
 Absent in the scholarly literature is an understanding of the largely hidden practice of letter-
marking, the relative success of letter-marking in securing distributive benefits, and the degree to which 
agencies are influenced by letters requesting distributive benefits from members of Congress.  To address 
this gap, we develop an in-depth case study and empirical model of the U.S. Federal Aviation 
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Administration’s (FAA) decision to withdraw funding of 173 air traffic control towers in the Federal 
Contract Tower Program (FCTP) as a result of sequestration contained in the Budget Control Act of 2011.  
Following its announcement of the closing of the towers, the FAA entertained appeals from local 
communities to argue why it was in the national interest for their tower to remain operational.  During this 
appeal process, members of Congress engaged in letter-marking by writing over 100 letters to the agency 
and the Department of Transportation (DOT) demanding that towers in their states and districts (and the 
associated local jobs) be retained.  The appeal process resulted in 24 towers receiving exemptions to 
continue operation.   
Using the unique dataset of the more than 100 Congressional letters written in support of their 
community’s air traffic control towers, we empirically assess the degree to which the characteristics of 
members of Congress and the content of the letters written to the FAA affected the success of the letter in 
persuading the FAA to issue a national interest exemption.   The findings presented in this paper suggest 
that the rise of letter-marking due to the earmark moratorium in Congress gives agencies much more 
discretion over allocation decisions previously controlled by legislators, which allows agencies to rely on 
technical criteria, such as benefit-cost analysis, for deciding where to allocate or retain projects.  This paper 
develops a new and novel approach to examining distributive benefit requests by members of Congress and 
allocations by agencies that has implications for accountability and the balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches.   
THE EVOLUTION OF EARMARKS AND THE RISE OF LETTER-MARKING 
The moratorium on earmarks passed by the 111th and 112th Congresses led to the rise of a new 
strategy by Congressional members to secure distributive benefits: Letter-marking. Letter-marking occurs 
when members of Congress explicitly ask (in writing) the head of an administrative agency to retain or 
allocate distributive benefits in their districts.  Media accounts labeled letter-marking “the influence-
peddling between the administration and Congress that the public does not often see” (Bogardus and Laing 
2013, p. 2).  While members of Congress routinely write letters in support of projects for their districts, 
only recently have agencies targeted those letters.  Prior to the moratorium on earmarks enacted in 2011, 
members of Congress routinely wrote letters to appropriations subcommittee chairs (known as cardinals) 
for earmarks to be included in appropriations legislation (Frisch 1998; Evans 2004).  These letters contained 
the name of the project, the rationale, and a requested dollar amount.  Thus, members often directed their 
energy and political capital on influencing the appropriations cardinals rather than the agencies themselves 
because the earmarks were legally binding and left little room for agency interpretation (Sciara 2012).   
Importantly, these earmarks could direct agencies to direct funds from both formula-based and discretionary 
allocation programs to specific projects contained in the earmark requests (Sciara 2012).  Following passage 
of an appropriations bill containing earmarks, members of Congress often write letters to agencies with 
specifics of how they would like the programmatic elements of the earmark implemented (Nixon 2010).  
Unlike previous reporting requirements for earmarks, letters written to agencies are not required to be 
publicized by the member of Congress and require a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the 
agency for the specific allocation decision (Carroll 2013).  This action allows members of Congress to 
publically advocate for reductions in government spending while working behind the scenes to secure 
federally funded projects for their districts (Bogardus and Laing 2013).   
Today, letter-marking is a common practice among members of Congress that spans several 
agencies for a wide range of projects including harbor dredging from the Army Corps of Engineers, new 
hospitals from the Department of Veterans Affairs, health research facilities operated by the Department of 
Defense, and requests for runway improvements from the Federal Aviation Administration (Nixon 2010; 
Hernandez 2011; Stein 2011; Nixon 2012).   The process for directing funds to a member’s district begins 
with a call for programmatic requests or language requests from constituents by members of Congress1. 
Programmatic requests allow Congressional members to propose total funding amounts for programs but 
do not allow for the identification of specific projects to be funded.  Language requests do not direct funding 
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to a particular entity but encourages, urges, or directs some type of action by an agency.  Constituents (and 
presumably organized interests) identify projects and areas of need within the member’s district that they 
want funded by the federal government.  The member of Congress then writes to appropriations cardinals 
to have their programmatic or language requests inserted into the bill or report language.   Once the 
programmatic request is enacted as part of the appropriations bill, members of Congress write letters to the 
head of an administrative agency asking (or demanding) the agency retain, or allocate, distributive benefits 
in their districts.  In an examination of the allocation of discretionary projects by the Army Corps of 
Engineers, Nixon (2012) found the deficit-constrained Congress not only exceeded the President’s request 
for funding for the Army Corps of Engineers, but members inserted a provision that directed the agency to 
consider the number of jobs created by a project as a criteria for the allocation of those projects.  Members 
of Congress then wrote letters to the Army Corps of Engineers with estimates of how many jobs the projects 
in the districts they supported would create.  
The rise of letter-marking as a vehicle for the allocation and retention of federally funded projects 
in Congressional members’ districts has serious implications for the literature on distributive politics, 
accountability, and for the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches.  The shift from 
Congressional earmarking to letter-marking places greater authority for the allocation of distributive 
benefits in the hands of agencies, which then raises several important questions for scholarly inquiry, 
including: the degree to which characteristics of Congressional members result in more successful appeals 
to agencies for distributive benefits through letter-marking; the influence of the arguments made in letters 
in the allocation decision; and the degree to which the agency balances its desire to use technical expertise 
with the political pressure imposed by letters written by members of Congress.  We explore these questions 
using the case of the FAA’s Contract Tower Program.   
THE CASE: THE FEDERAL CONTRACT TOWER PROGRAM 
The FAA is the primary government agency responsible for regulating aviation in the United States.  
In addition to serving as a regulatory agency, the FAA is also the operational provider of air traffic control 
services and is responsible for secure and efficient air traffic management services and aeronautical 
information to customers operating in the national airspace system. In addition to the 264 air traffic control 
towers operated by the FAA and its unionized controllers, the agency also oversees and funds 252 towers 
operated by private contractors through the Federal Contract Tower Program (FCTP).  Under the FCTP, 
the FAA can contract with private entities to provide air traffic control services at airports operating under 
visual flight rules (VFR) that did not formerly have a tower or wanted to convert a former federal tower to 
a contract tower. These airports tend to be in smaller communities, have little commercial service, and less 
complex airspace than at larger airports.  However, the presence of a tower in these smaller communities 
typically has an impact on the local economy through the jobs created by the tower and increased activity 
at the airfield (USCTA 2011).   
  The FCTP was created as a pilot program in 1982 to contract for air traffic control services for five 
low activity towers closed as a result of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 
strike in 1981. Through the next decade, the FAA established a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) process to 
evaluate the possibility of contracting out existing FAA towers to contract towers to reduce overall costs.2 
In 1993, Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review (NPR) endorsed the FCTP as a way to 
realize substantial cost-savings by contracting out over 100 existing low-level FAA towers to contract 
towers.  During the process of contracting out the existing FAA towers, however, members of Congress 
pressured the FAA to accept applications from airports that did not have existing towers on their airfield.  
In the 1998 Department of Transportation Appropriation Act, members of Congress included funding of 
$43.7 million for the FCTP along with several administrative provisions that earmarked air traffic control 
towers for several communities without towers at their airports (Mills 2013).   
Congress would further insulate the FCTP by establishing a cost-share program in 1999 that 
allowed communities with towers whose B-C ratio had fallen below 1.0 to pay for the portion of costs that 
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exceeded the benefits of the tower.  For example, under the cost-share program, if an airport had a B-C ratio 
of .90, the FAA would pay 90% of the costs of operating the tower while the local airport authority or 
sponsor would pay the remaining 10%.  This approach allowed several non-cost-beneficial towers to remain 
open and allowed members of Congress who fought for the legislation the opportunity to claim that they 
saved the tower in their districts.  Finally, recent appropriations bills included limitation riders that prohibit 
the agency from spending less than a certain amount on the FCTP (MacDonald 2010; Mills 2013).  The 
earmarking of specific locations for contract towers along with Congress’s micromanagement of the FAA’s 
BCA process led to the expansion of the FCTP from 5 towers in 1982 to over 250 towers in 45 of the 50 
states today.   
SEQUESTRATION AND THE FCTP 
A key provision of the Budget Control Act of 2011 stated that if the Joint Select Committee on 
Deficit Reduction could not develop a budget resolution by the end of 2012, it would trigger $1.2 trillion 
in automatic budget cuts through a process known as budget sequestration. While members of Congress 
reached an agreement to extend the deadline for sequestration to March 1, 2013 with the passage of the 
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, they were not able to develop a budget resolution before the new 
deadline.  Following the enactment of sequestration, on March 1, 2013, the FAA announced that it would 
cease funding to 173 towers in the FCTP in order to allow the agency to achieve a portion of its $633 
million in cost reductions required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (CRS 2013).  The 
FAA chose the 173 (of the 250 total towers) slated for closure by relying on a set of operational thresholds 
developed by the OMB:  towers with fewer than 150,000 total operations or fewer than 10,000 commercial 
operations would be closed.  Importantly, the OMB’s selection of operational thresholds meant that even 
some towers with B-C ratios over 1.0 would be slated for closure. That the OMB targeted the FCTP for a 
significant portion of the cuts from the FAA’s operating budget was due to the fact that many in the 
Administration viewed the program as a subsidy to business-jet travellers (Mills 2013). Additionally, some 
commentators argued that the agency’s decision to cut the FCTP was in an effort to cause pain to members 
of Congress in their districts while raising the salience of the sequestration cuts to the general public (Stiles 
2013).  
As part of the process for notifying airports their contract tower funding would be withdrawn, the 
FAA allowed airports to appeal the decision by providing evidence that their airport tower’s closure would 
negatively impact the national interest.  The FAA gave airports one week to provide evidence of this effect 
by showing their tower closing would: 
Pose significant threats to the national security as determined by the FAA in consultation with the 
Department of Defense or the Department of Homeland Security; 
Cause significant, adverse economic impact that is beyond the impact on a local community;  
Cause significant impact on multistate transportation, communication or banking/financial networks.  
 
Interestingly, the FAA noted that providing evidence of a substantial national interest “will not 
necessarily result in any particular tower remaining open” (FCTP Closure Notification Letter 2013).  
Following the announcement of the towers to be closed, the United States Contract Tower 
Association (USCTA), encouraged its members to not only file formal national interest exemption appeals 
with the FAA, but also to contact their Representatives or Senators to put pressure on the FAA to spare 
their tower from the proposed cuts (Mills 2013).  During the appeal process, the FAA and the DOT received 
101 letters from 103 members of Congress demanding that the agency grant an exemption to keep the tower 
in their state or district open.   
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On March 22, 2013, the FAA announced that it would issue 24 national interest exemptions to 
contract towers it initially identified for closure.  Figure 1 traces the number of towers involved in each 
decision made by the FAA.  Of the 24 towers granted exemptions, 14 had a letter written in support of their 
exemption by a member of Congress, with 3 of those towers receiving multiple letters from members of 
Congress. Following the FAA’s announcement of national interest exemptions, Senator Jerry Moran (R-
KS) and Senator Richard Blumenthal (D-CT) introduced amendments and legislation to give the FAA the 
flexibility to shift money from its other accounts (namely, the Airport Improvement Program, which is used 
to fund airport infrastructure improvement projects) to continue funding the operations of the FCTP.   In 
another illustration of the wide-reaching impact of the FCTP, Congress passed the Reducing Flight Delays 
Act of 2013 to allow the FAA to shift over $250 million from the FAA’s Airport Improvement Program 
(AIP) account to its operations account to continue funding the FCTP and operations at small FAA-operated 
towers. The FCTP was one of the only programs in the federal government spared from the sequestration’s 
mandatory cuts.   
The FAA case raises a series of interesting and unaddressed questions with important implications 
for the future of scholarly inquiry in the area of distributive politics.  Were the characteristics of the 
Congressional members writing letters a significant factor in determining the success of their letters in 
advocating for a national interest exemption from the FAA?  To what extent did the FAA rely on its own 
policy preferences and established B-C process to allocate national interest exemptions in this highly 
politicized environment?  To assess these questions, we develop a series of theoretical expectations to 
examine what specific institutional and personal characteristics of letter writers impacted the FAA’s 
decision to allocate national interest exemptions.   
GENERATING THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS: THE LINK BETWEEN DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 
AND LETTER-MARKING  
Distributive policies target discrete benefits to specific populations such as states and congressional 
districts but spread the cost across the general population through taxation (Lowi 1964).  Evans (2004) 
argues that despite the journalistic treatment of “earmarks” and “pork-barrel” spending, distributive policy 
benefits are essential tools to overcome collective action problems in legislatures.  Much of the scholarly 
literature on distributive policy is legislative-centric in that it focuses on the conditions under which 
distributive policies are allocated through earmarks (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Rundquist and Ferejohn 
1975), as well as the use of institutional factors such as committees to produce distributive policies that 
help to build dominant majority coalitions or support for other general interest legislation (Arnold 1990; 
Kieweit and McCubbins 1991; Evans 2004; Cox and McCubbins 2005).   Scholars found significant 
relationships between electorally vulnerable members (Shepsle and Weingast 1981), majority party 
members (Evans 2004), ideologically liberal (Sidman and Mak 2006), senior members (Lazarus 2010), 
members holding positions of institutional authority (Lazarus 2010), and members representing 
geographically large districts (Frisch 1998; Lazarus 2010) and the allocation of distributive benefits through 
earmarks.   However, the shift from earmarking to letter-marking gives agencies more control over 
allocation decisions than in the past and necessitates a new set of theoretical expectations for allocation 
decisions by agencies.   
 While some scholars noted that distributive “awards are made in the byways of bureaucracies” 
(Lowry and Potoski 2004), little scholarly literature examines the internal and external conditions that affect 
the allocation decisions of bureaucratic agencies.  Arnold’s (1979) seminal work explicitly sought to 
understand the congressional-bureaucratic relationship with regards to geographic allocation of distributive 
benefits. He argued rational bureaucrats would engage in allocation strategies with the legislature: 
bureaucrats would distribute funds in a manner desired by legislators in order to maintain budgetary stability 
(Arnold 1979). Through his examination of military infrastructure projects, water and sewer projects, and 
the HUD Model cities grants, Arnold found strong support for his argument.  Given Arnold’s findings, we 
would expect agencies to allocate more benefits to members of Congress who directly influence the 
6
The Journal of Economics and Politics, Vol. 22 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://collected.jcu.edu/jep/vol22/iss1/4
 
 41 
agency’s budget and policy direction through membership on appropriations and authorization committees. 
Therefore,  
H1: Members of the FAA’s authorizing and appropriations committees who wrote letters to the FAA should 
receive more national interest exemptions than members on other committees.   
 
Traditionally, Congressional scholars found that members of the majority party in Congress secure 
more distributive benefits through earmarks than the minority party.  However, the recently implemented 
earmark ban limits the ability of members to use the institutional benefits of holding the majority in 
Congress to secure benefits.  Agencies responsible for allocating distributive benefits should be more 
receptive to requests from members of Congress from the same party as the administration given the desire 
to build a governing coalition to advance its policy agenda.  Therefore, in the case of the 113th Congress 
(2013-2014): 
H2: Democratic members of Congress who wrote letters to the FAA should receive more national interest 
exemptions than Republican members of Congress.  
 
In addition to the characteristics of members of Congress that wrote letters, it is important to 
account for the role of bureaucratic preferences in the efficient allocation of distributive benefits.  Krause 
(1996) and O’Toole and Meier (1999) stress the position that managers in public bureaucracies play in 
shaping how agency outputs respond to events from the policy environment in which agencies operate.  
Managers can either exploit events, or “shocks” to facilitate changes to policy outputs or dampen the effect 
of such events on agency behavior.  Additionally, Carpenter (2001) argues agencies seeking to preserve 
autonomy will use decision-making tools that illustrate their reputation for technical expertise.  The FAA’s 
most technical mechanism of measuring the value of its contract towers is its B-C ratio, which takes into 
account operational factors such as the amount of traffic at an airport and the role of the tower in providing 
safety and efficiency gains. Therefore,  
H3: The probability of the FAA issuing a national interest exemption in response to a letter from a member 
of Congress should increase as the B-C ratio of the tower mentioned in the letter increases.   
 
Finally, the content of the letter may have an effect on the FAA’s decision to issue a national interest 
exemption.  The FAA’s criteria for issuing national interest exemptions noted that it would allocate 
exemptions to those towers with a significant effect on the national economy or national air traffic safety, 
rather than a local economic or local air traffic safety impact. Therefore,  
H4: The probability of receiving a national interest exemption should increase when the letter mentions a 
national economic or national safety concern.   
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
To examine the influence of letter-marking in the allocation of national interest exemptions by the 
FAA, we use a unique dataset of these 101 letters written by members of Congress to the FAA and DOT 
from February 27, 2013 to March 23, 2013 appealing for the contract tower in their state or district to remain 
operational.  We catalogued each of the letters and identified the towers mentioned within the letter. The 
101 letters were written by 103 members of Congress, with some authored by individual members and other 
letters written by delegations of legislators ranging from two to six persons. Of those letters, 87 addressed 
one specific tower, while 14 addressed multiple towers.  
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As Tables 1, 2, and 3 demonstrate, the party, chamber, and number of signees varied across the 
letters; 52% of the letters written to the FAA requesting national interest exemptions came from Democrats 
while another 45% came from Republicans.  Three of the letters were co-signed by Republicans and 
Democrats (as indicated by Table 1).  Beyond partisanship, Table 2 breaks down authorship by chamber, 
and illustrates that Democratic members of the House of Representatives signed 40% of the letters with 
another 36% signed by Republican members of the House.  Senators from the Democratic Party signed 
12% of the letters to the FAA while Republican Senators signed another 13%.  Finally, Table 3 presents 
the members of Congress who wrote more than one individually signed letter to the FAA requesting that 
towers in their state of districts be retained.  Senators Bill Nelson (D-FL) and Kay Hagan (D-NC) each 
wrote 5 letters in support of national exemptions for towers in their states.  Evident from these tables is the 
wide variety in letter-marking attention the issue received — from representatives in both houses of 
Congress and from both sides of the aisle.  
Turning to the content of the letters written to the FAA, members of Congress focused primarily 
on two categories of arguments.  First, many members noted the important role that the tower in their district 
or state plays in ensuring safety and security.  Representative Alan Grayson (D-FL) suggested the tower at 
Kissimmee Gateway Airport (ISM) provides important safety and security benefits to his district: 
 ISM affords separation of Kissimmee aircraft from MCO’s (Orlando International 
 Airport) approach and departure corridors.  Further, it protects the Disney  Temporary 
Flight Restricted Area immediately to the Northwest-flight space, which  may someday be used in the War 
on Terror if the various reports of Al Qaeda  targeting Disney are true (March 13, 2013). 
A second argument made by many members of Congress in their requests for national interest 
exemptions to the FAA was that the tower provided important economic benefits to the region, state, and 
nation.  Representative Marcy Kaptur (D-OH) argued Cuyahoga County Airport should receive an 
exemption due to the local jobs supported by the airport and the tower: 
 {The Airport} is located in one of the heaviest concentrations of industrial  development in 
the state of Ohio, but also the home to burgeoning health care and  biomedical, alternative energy, 
and education sectors.  The airport has an estimated  annual payroll of $60 million and the source, 
either directly or indirectly, for the  employment of more than 3,000 people (March 11, 2013).  
The authors coded each of the letters to determine whether particular arguments made by members 
of Congress were more effective than others during the national interest exemption appeal process. Letters 
were coded according to five categories: national safety impact, national economic impact, local safety 
impact, local economic impact, and military impact. The authors coded the letters and asked a graduate 
student to code the same letters using the same coding scheme, resulting in a Cohen’s kappa score of 84%.3  
This coding resulted in 101 letters with 44 mentions of national economic impact, 41 mentions of local 
economic impact, 42 mentions of local safety impact, 35 mentions of national safety impact, and 48 
mentions of military impacts. The data were collapsed into an additive index that measured the argued 
national impact of closing the tower, which ranged from 0 to 3, indicating the different types of national 
effects (economic, safety, and military). Of these letters, about 16% were successful in receiving an 
exemption from tower closure. If we look at letters written by one member of Congress about one tower, 
about 11% were successful. These data are summarized in Table 4.  
While the information garnered from the letters shares some information about author motivations, 
it does not necessarily speak to the probability of a letter being successful. Put differently, writing these 
letters is clearly an effort by the legislator to get some sort of distributive benefits for their district, but what 
factors actually determine if the benefits are delivered? To address the question of letter success, the data 
gathered from the letters were merged with additional information on the tower’s benefit-cost ratio as 
determined by the FAA, the letter-writer’s party, their electoral security, tenure in office, economic 
performance of their district, and committee service.4 In this discussion, we focus specifically on the letters 
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written by one legislator, addressing one tower. We will discuss the motivations for this approach later in 
the paper.  
 In order to measure agency policy preferences and the use of technical expertise by the FAA, we 
use the agency’s latest published B-C ratio for each tower in the FCTP.  The FAA’s BCA compares the 
annual operating and capital costs of the contract tower to the benefit of the tower to the national airspace 
system through the rigorous quantification of avoided accidents, collisions, fatalities, and aircraft damage 
due to the presence of an air traffic tower at the airport.5 The overall B-C ratio for an airport is primarily 
driven by the level of traffic at an airport — as more traffic occurs at an airport, the benefit of the ability of 
a tower to provide aircraft separation services becomes greater as there is more potential for an accident.  If 
a tower achieves a B-C ratio above 1.0, it is deemed to be a cost-beneficial project for federal investment.  
The higher the B-C ratio, the more operational importance the tower has on the FAA’s overall air traffic 
control program.   In our sample, the B-C ratios range from 0.99 to 14.41 with a mean of 2.16 and standard 
deviation of 1.88, indicating a wide range of values for each tower.  The wide range of B-C ratios is due 
largely to the crude criteria used by OMB to determine the initial list for closure.  For example, if an airport 
had 9,000 annual commercial operations (under the OMB threshold of 10,000 commercial operations) with 
a large aircraft such as a Boeing 767 or 777 and less than 150,000 total annual operations, it would be closed 
under the OMB criteria, but would have a very high B-C ratio due to the large avoided fatality benefit 
associated with the large aircraft flying into the airport. 6 
 Beyond the B-C ratio, we include a binary measure of party, coded as “1” if the letter writer is 
Republican and “0” if they identify as Democrat to account for potential benefits Democrats may receive 
from the Democrat administration. We also account for the potential increase in benefits to weak 
Democrats, by including a measure of electoral security. This variable is represented as the percent of 
district voting in favor of the incumbent in the prior election and ranges from 41.9% to 100%, for members 
who ran unopposed. As discussed earlier, we expect agencies to allocate greater benefits to members of 
Congress who have a direct impact on the agency budget and policy direction. We therefore include a binary 
measure of committee membership for both the relevant authorization or appropriation committees. These 
measures are coded as “1’’ if the letter writer serves on the committee or “0” if they do not.  
 In addition to the covariates of interest, we also include a series of control variables to account for 
other institutional factors that may impact the likelihood of a letter being successful in garnering an 
exemption.  Previous literature suggests senior members are more likely to receive federal benefits, and 
therefore it is natural to expect letters from more senior members of Congress to carry more weight and 
result in an exemption (see Lee 2003; Roberts 1990; among others). To this end, we include a variable 
coded as the share of freshman authoring the letter, ranging from 0 if there are no freshman authors to 100 
if all the authors are freshman. As our data sample is limited to letters written by one author about one 
tower, our data are labeled as “100’’ or “0’’ respectively. Previous literature on distributive benefit 
allocations also found that economically distressed districts and states receive a higher proportion of 
benefits than those with high economic performance (Hird 1990; Lazarus 2010).  Therefore, we account 
for the potential economic health of the region, measured as the percent of the state that is unemployed.   
In order to understand what factors impact the successful receipt of distributive benefits in the form 
of a tower exemption, we estimate a model with letter success as the dependent variable. Given the binary 
nature of this variable, we employ a logit specification. The dependent variable in our models is the 
aforementioned binary measure coded as “1” if the letter was successful in garnering an exemption, and 
“0” if it was not. As previously stated, the unit of analysis is the individual letter.  
RESULTS 
Table 5 presents the results of a model estimating the likelihood of a letter producing a successful 
exemption for the tower. The coefficients are in log-odds scale with robust standard errors for letters written 
by a single legislator addressing a single tower. We focus on this specification due to the nature and 
availability of our data.7 A positive coefficient indicates an increase in the log-odds of the letter being 
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successful (the tower receiving an exemption). A negative coefficient indicates a decrease in the log-odds 
of letter success.8  
 The expectations laid out in the hypotheses suggest letters written by members serving on relevant 
committees are democrats, referencing towers with a high B-C ratio, or referencing a national interest that 
should see greater odds of success. A cursory review of Table 5 illustrates the expectations are confirmed.  
Turning first to the Tower B-C covariate, we see a positive and significant effect on our dependent variable.  
Substantively, this result suggests, as the B-C ratio increases (signaling greater operational importance in 
the FAA’s overall air traffic control program) the probability of a letter written on behalf of the tower being 
successful increases as well. If we were to examine the results as predicted probabilities, contrast the 
probability of a tower with the lowest B-C ratio in our sample (Sawyer International Airport in Gwinn, 
Michigan (SAW) has a B-C ratio of .99) versus a tower with the highest B-C ratio in our sample 
(Kalaeloa Airport in Hawaii (JRF) has a B-C ratio of 14.41).9 The probability of receiving an exemption 
for letters written about towers with the lowest B-C ratios is essentially 0, while the probability of receiving 
an exemption for letters written about towers with the highest B-C ratios is close to 1 – a change in 
probability of about .99 across the entire range of the variable.   
Even if we compare the predicted probabilities for towers with the lowest B-C ratios to those with 
the highest B-C ratio within the range of the majority of our observations (Mobile, AL (BFM) has a B-C 
ratio of 6.06), the change in probabilities from the minimum value to 6.06 is still .99.10  Figure 2 plots the 
full range of predicted probabilities and associated 95% confidence intervals across all values of the B-C 
ratio. The probabilities are significant at B-C ratios greater than 3.99.  This result confirms the expectations 
laid out in the third hypothesis and suggests the positive effect of letter-marking is limited to towers already 
seen as important by the FAA. 
 Turning to the other covariates of interest, it is clear that letters written by a Republican are less 
likely to be successful (though this variable is only significant at the .10 level). In fact, Republicans are 
nearly 17 times more likely to have an unsuccessful letter than their Democratic counterparts. This confirms 
the second hypothesis, which expected agencies responsible for allocating distributive benefits to be more 
receptive to requests from members of Congress of the same party as the administration. Interestingly, 
committee membership, specifically membership on the authorization committee, also decreases the odds 
of a successful letter. Here, members of the authorization committee are about 15 times more likely to have 
an unsuccessful letter than when compared to members of other committees. While this does not completely 
negate our first hypothesis, it does suggest that it is not just membership on any relevant committee that 
increases the likelihood of success, but instead certain relevant committees. We explore this result further 
in the discussion.  
 One of the more interesting results to emerge from the model is the lack of significance of the letter 
content on whether the letter was successful in receiving an exemption. We found no support for our fourth 
hypothesis, which expected the probability of receiving an exemption to increase when the letter focused 
on national economic or national safety concerns. This hypothesis is the only one to find no level of support 
in our models, and in fact, the topic and content of the letters had no statistically significant effect on the 
likelihood of a letter successfully advocating for a tower to receive an exemption. In other words, towers 
with a perceived national safety importance were no more likely to be spared than those with no impact on 
safety.  
 Beyond the covariates of interest, two of the control variables proved significant: the author’s prior 
vote share and his/her tenure in office. Both control variables were negative and significant, indicating they 
decreased the likelihood of a successful letter.  In terms of odds ratios, the percentage change in odds 
associated with a one percent change in the letter writer’s prior vote share yields about a 6 percent drop in 
the odds of a successful letter. There was no significant interaction between this variable and our measure 
of party, indicating benefits were not distributed to prop up weaker members of the President’s party. 
Similarly, letters written by freshman are about 1.17 times more likely to be unsuccessful than when 
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compared to their more senior colleagues. This result is consistent with previous literature suggesting senior 
members and more secure members carry more weight in allocation decisions. 
 Based on these results, the key important factor in driving allocation decisions in letter-marking 
are the agency’s own technical measure (the tower’s benefit-cost ratio), the party of the letter writer, and 
their committee membership; however, so far the only factor responsible for increasing the odds of writing 
a successful letter is advocating for a tower with a high benefit-cost ratio.  
DISCUSSION: THE ROLE OF LETTER-MARKING IN THE ALLOCATION OF DISTRIBUTIVE 
BENEFITS 
The largely unexplored phenomenon of letter-marking by members of Congress to secure 
distributive benefits for their districts has important implications for the future study of legislative-executive 
interactions.  The most striking finding from our analysis is that the ban on earmarks has not entirely 
eliminated politics from allocation decisions.  To the contrary, the earmark ban shifted the decision to 
politicize an allocation decision from Congress to agencies.  Using Ting’s (2012) language, the earmark 
ban in Congress has, at least in this case, professionalized the decision-making process by agencies by 
allowing them to use non-political tools, such as the B-C ratio used here, to justify allocations while also 
politicizing it by allowing agencies to approve or deny requests contained in letters from members of 
Congress.  The results of our statistical analysis find that, in the face of pressure from members of Congress 
to allocate national interest exemptions, the FAA relied on its neutral benefit-cost analysis to determine 
which towers would be kept operational.  This suggests that letter-marking has little effect unless the agency 
responsible for the allocation decision views the project or benefit as worthwhile and consistent with its 
own policy preferences.  More importantly, the importance of the B-C ratio suggests agencies can pursue 
their own policy preferences during allocation decisions, while members of Congress command much less 
control over the decision-making process.  Finally, as Mills (2013) argues, the importance of agency 
decision-making tools in the allocation decision may also lead to members of Congress attempting to 
modify and micromanage tools such as benefit-cost analysis through authorizing and appropriations 
legislation.   
 In addition to the agency’s own preference for the benefit requested in a letter, we find that 
characteristics of the member of Congress who authored the letter had a significant effect on the agency’s 
decision-making process. Our analysis also finds the FAA, as part of the Obama Administration, was less 
willing to grant national interest exemptions requested in letters to Republican members of Congress.  
While the previous literature on earmarking suggested that distributive benefits could be used to build 
coalitions for legislation and to avoid gridlock (see Evans 2004 and Frisch and Kelly 2011), our analysis 
provides evidence that, in a divided Congress, members of Congress from the party controlling the 
executive branch will receive more distributive benefits than the party out of power.  This finding provides 
support for the thesis that with the earmark ban in Congress, building coalitions to pass even routine 
legislation will be difficult, if not impossible (Frisch and Kelly 2011).   
 Surprisingly, we find that the FAA was much less likely to grant national interest exemptions to 
letter-writers who were on the FAA’s authorizing committees.  This finding is consistent with news 
accounts that suggested the agency was punishing those members of Congress most familiar with the 
agency for sequestration cuts that threatened the agency’s mission (Stiles 2013). We also find that other 
characteristics of the author significantly affect the success of the letter in securing distributive benefits.  
The FAA was much less likely to issue a national interest exemption to a newly elected member of 
Congress.  This finding is consistent with previous literature on earmarking (Lazarus 2010).  More 
importantly, the fact that the agency is less swayed by letters from freshman members of Congress means 
that it may be more difficult for these members to “bring home the bacon” to their districts — a fact that 
may not be as important given the support for many “tea-party” conservatives who, at least publically, 
oppose distributive policy allocations.   
11
Mills and Kalaf-Hughes: Letter-Marking
Published by Carroll Collected, 2015
 46 
 Finally, our analysis finds that the content of the letter has little to do with whether or not it resulted 
in success.  There are several possible explanations for this.  First, the fact that many members of Congress 
touted the importance of towers to the local economy despite the FAA’s direction to highlight national 
impacts suggests the purpose of the letter was not to persuade the FAA on the merits of the argument rather 
to exert political pressure on the agency to grant an exemption.  Second, it is likely that in most cases the 
FAA was aware of the national economic, safety, and military consequences of closing the tower raised in 
the letters from members of Congress.  This is consistent with much of the principal-agent literature that 
suggests bureaucratic agencies enjoy an information advantage over elected officials by possessing expert 
knowledge on specific policy issues (e.g. Aberbach 1990; Krause 1996; Epstein & O’Halloran 1999; Huber 
& Shipan 2002).  The lack of importance of the content of the letter, the use of the B-C ratio in the FAA’s 
decision-making, and the significance of some political factors such as seniority and party of the letter-
writer suggest that in the earmark-ban era, agencies control the allocation of distributive benefits and can 
choose to professionalize or politicize the decision depending upon their policy preferences and desire to 
build support for their mission.   
   
CONCLUSION 
The earmark ban enacted by Congress led to the rise of letter-marking as a mechanism for members 
of Congress to secure distributive benefits for their districts.  While letter-marking has become prevalent in 
Washington, the scholarly literature on executive-legislative relations has largely ignored this common 
practice.  Our paper makes a significant contribution to the bureaucratic politics and Congressional 
literature by finding that, while members of Congress can attempt lobby for projects in their districts, letter-
marking shifts control from the allocation of distributive benefits to bureaucratic agencies.   The key finding 
from our analysis is that while Congress controlled the decision to politicize the allocation of distributive 
benefits when earmarks were permitted, the decision to politicize or professionalize now rests with the 
agency.   In the wake of the FAA’s decision to close 173 contract control towers, members of Congress 
wrote over 100 letters to the agency demanding that the towers in their district remain operational.  The 
FAA decided to professionalize the allocation decision, relying primarily on its benefit-cost analysis to 
determine which towers would receive national interest exemptions.  However, the agency also politicized 
the decision by granting fewer exemptions to Republican members of Congress who wrote letters and by 
penalizing members of the agency’s authorizing committee by granting fewer exemptions in response to 
letters from those members.    
 A major limitation for future comparative or cross-agency studies of letter-marking is the difficulty 
in gaining access to letters written by members of Congress to agencies.   Scholars must have knowledge 
of a pending or recently enacted policy decision and must submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request immediately following the decision.  Another challenge is that agencies are very uneven in the 
quality and thoroughness of record keeping.  The author’s intimate knowledge of the FAA was instrumental 
in gaining access to the letters used in this study.  Future work that examines letter-marking should focus 
on a systematic method of collecting letters across agencies and distributive benefit allocations.   
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FIGURE 1: FCTP CLOSURE AND NATIONAL INTEREST EXEMPTION PROCESS 
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FIGURE 2: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF LETTER SUCCESS AS A FUNCTION OF 
B-C RATIO 
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TABLE 1: LETTERS WRITTEN BY PARTY OF AUTHORS 
 
Author Party Affiliation Number of Letters Percent Total 
Democrats 53 52.48 
Republicans 45 44.55 
Democrats and Republicans   3 2.97 
Total Letters 101 100 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: LETTERS WRITTEN BY COMPOSITION OF AUTHORS 
 
Author Composition Number of Individual Writers Percent Total 
Representative - Democrat 41 39.80 
Representative - Republican 37 35.92 
Senator - Democrat 13 11.65 
Senator - Republican 12 12.62 
Total Authors 103 100 
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TABLE 3: MULTIPLE LETTER WRITERS – INDIVIDUALS 
 
Name Party Number of Letters Towers 
Representatives    
  Michele Bachmann R 3 STC, ANE/STC, ANE 
  Alan Grayson D 2 ISM 
  Andy Harris R 2 ESN, SBY 
  Dennis Ross R 2 LAL 
  Edward Royce R 2 FUL 
  Frederica Wilson D 2 HWO 
  John Fleming R 2 DTN/CWF 
  Ron Kind D 2 LSE, EAU 
  Steve Cohen D 2 NQA 
Senators    
  Bill Nelson D 5 EVB, BCT, ISM, OCF, LEE 
  Kay Hagan D 5 HKY, INT, EWN, ISO, JQF 
  Debbie Stabenow D 2 BTL, SAW 
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TABLE 4: LETTERS MENTIONING TOWERS RECEIVING NATIONAL INTEREST 
EXEMPTIONS  
Tower and Location Number of 
Letters 
Letter Writers(s) Party 
Mobile, AL (BFM) 
 
Kissimmee, FL (ISM) 
 
 
Honolulu, HI (JRF) 
 
Columbus, MS (GTR) 
 
Klamath Falls, OR (LMT) 
 
1 
 
3 
 
 
1 
 
1 
 
1 
Rep. Jo Bonner  
 
Rep. Alan Grayson (2) 
Sen. Bill Nelson  
 
Sen. Mazie Hirono 
 
Rep. Alan Nunnelee 
 
Rep. Greg Walden 
 
R 
 
D 
D 
 
D 
 
R 
 
D 
Total Number of Letters  7   
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TABLE 5: LOGIT ESTIMATES OF LETTER SUCCESS 
   Single Author/Tower  
 Tower B-C 2.914*  
  (1.182)  
 Party  -2.815+  
  (1.610)  
 Prior Vote Share -0.064*  
  (0.030)  
 Freshman Share -0.157***  
  (0.050)  
 State Unemployment 0.7  
  (0.650)  
 Authorization Committee -2.738**  
  (1.000)  
 Appropriations Committee 2.344  
  (2.060)  
 National Impact 0.061  
  (0.350)  
 Constant -9.764  
   (7.470)  
 N            62  
      
 + < .10; * p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001   
Note: Coefficients reported as log odds. Dependent variable is a binary measure of letter success, 
with a "1"' indicating the tower discussed in the letter received an exemption and a "0" indicating 
no exemption was received. 
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Dependent Variable           
Letter Success 63 0.111 0.316 0 1 
      
Independent Variables           
Tower B-C 63 2.16 1.882 0.99 14.41 
Party 67 0.418 0.497 0 1 
Prior Vote Share 66 63.492 12.658 41.9 100 
Freshman 67 11.94 32.671 0 100 
State Unemployment 67 7.256 1.236 4.675 9.433 
Authorization Committee 67 0.254 0.438 0 1 
Appropriations Committee 67 0.104 0.308 0 1 
National Impact 67 1.179 0.92 0 3 
Note: Summary statistics for letters written by one member of Congress addressing one tower. 
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APPENDIX B: ALTERNATIVE MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
   
All Authors/          
All Towers 
All Authors/       
One Tower  
 Tower B-C 1.021+        1.163+  
  (0.546) (0.618)  
 Party  0 -0.006  
  (0.007) (0.010)  
 Prior Vote Share 0.016 -0.025  
  (0.028) (0.025)  
 Freshman Share -0.018 -0.076  
  (0.014) (0.054)  
 State Unemployment -0.021 0.179  
  (0.298) (0.368)  
 Authorization Committee -0.658 -1.166  
  (1.109) (1.279)  
 Appropriations Committee 0.706 1.42  
  (0.778) (1.092)  
 National Impact 0.377 0.199  
  (0.283) (0.355)  
 Constant  -5.407*   -4.5  
   (2.428) (3.143)  
 N            89 77  
        
 + < .10; * p<0.05;  ** p<0.01;  *** p<0.001   
Note: Coefficients reported as log odds. Dependent variable is a binary measure of letter success, 
with a "1"' indicating the tower discussed in the letter received an exemption and a "0" indicating 
no exemption was received. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 For an example of this request, see the website of Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee: 
http://jacksonlee.house.gov/appropriations-requests-fy-2014 
 
2 See Mills (2013) for a full review of the FAA’s BCA process.  
 
3 The authors calculated Cohen’s kappa due to the fact that two reviewers coded the nominal variable of 
each code for each Congressional letter.  The 84% Cohen’s kappa value is above the acceptable level of 
70% outlined in the literature (see Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken 2002).   
4 See Appendix B for summary statistics for each variable of interest 
5 Model illustrated in Supporting Information. For more detail, see Mills (2013).     
6 The average contract tower airport has approximately 56,000 annual operations.  For comparison, 
Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson airport has over 900,000 annual operations.   
7 Alternative specifications were estimated, including pooling all letters together (any number of authors 
with any number of towers discussed) and the letters written by any number of authors that addressed 
only one tower. When we examine letters addressing multiple towers, we lose some of the precision in 
our estimates as it required us to average measures that are unique to individual towers, such as the B-C 
ratio. Additionally, we must average across members in terms of electoral security, paty, and freshman 
status. Nevertheless, in both alternative specifications of our model, the tower B-C ratio was the lone 
positive and significant variable, though at the .10 level. As 87% of our letters were written by one 
member and addressed the potential closure of one tower, we report and discuss the coefficients from this 
more robust model in detail. Appendix C presents the results from these alternative models.  
8 Working with only 62 observations in this formation of our data may produce some concerns about the 
limited predictive capabilities in this data. To verify our results, we estimated additional alternative logit 
specifications (discussed in the previous endnote) as well as an OLS model using the same covariates and 
sample as in Table 2 (OLS models for binary choice variables with small sample size are suggested as an 
option by numerous scholars (c.f. Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Noreen 1988; among others)). The OLS 
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model provided similar results to the logit, particularly in the case of the tower’s B-C ratio, however, we 
present the results of the logit model as the functional form of the model best represents our data and the 
misclassification rates are lower than in OLS. 
9 The predicted probabilities were calculated using the margins post-estimation command in Stata.  
10 On initial viewing, the B-C ratio of JRF appears to be an outlier as it is will beyond the range of the rest 
of our data (no tower in our sample had a B-C ratio between 6.06 and 14.41). However, removing this 
data point did not skew our results in any way, and the tower B-C variable remained positive and 
significant in estimations with and without this data point. The lack of observations across this range of 
the data is responsible for the large confidence intervals seen in Figure 2 in this region of our data.  
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